Two Liberal Fallacies in the Hate Crimes Debate by Kahan, Dan M
DAN M. KAHAN ?
TWO LIBERAL FALLACIES IN THE HATE CRIMES DEBATE
(Accepted 26 November 2000)
Those for and against hate crime laws debate each other in the
shadow of John Stuart Mill. Both accept the Millian premise that
the state is justified in coercing an individual only to prevent harm to
others and not to condemn that individual for holding objectionable
beliefs, values, or preferences.1
They purport to disagree only about what that principle – the
guiding tenet of modern liberalism – entails. Because hate crime
laws distinguish between otherwise identical assaults based solely
on offenders’ motives, the opponents of those laws see them as
singling out hate criminals for additional punishment solely because
of their noxious ideologies. The proponents of hate crime laws, in
contrast, disclaim any interest in punishing offenders for their values
and insist that such laws are warranted strictly by the greater harms
that hate crimes inflict, both on their victims and on third parties. At
that point, the debate usually turns empirical. Is the “greater harm”
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argument factually sound? Do the political sponsors of hate crime
laws “really” believe that argument, or is the “greater harms” claim
just a pretext for their illiberal desire to use state power to condemn
values they abhor?
My goal in this essay is to extricate the hate crimes debate
from this pattern of argument. The moral legitimacy of hate crime
laws, I’ll try to show, doesn’t depend on whether those laws punish
“harms” or instead punish “values.” Indeed, it can’t possibly depend
on that. For unless we take an actor’s motivating values into account,
we lack the normative resources necessary to identify and evaluate
the harm imposed by her actions. By disparaging hate crime laws
for condemning offenders’ motivating values, the critics subject
such laws to a test incompatible with the basic theory of culpability
that animates the criminal law. By suggesting that hate crime laws
pass this test, the proponents of theses law advance a conceptu-
ally insupportable claim, the weakness of which does unnecessary
discredit to the provisions they are defending.
The only way to figure out whether hate crime laws are morally
legitimate is to determine whether the assessment they make of
offenders’ motives is right or wrong. Do hate crimes in fact express
valuations that are more reprehensible than those expressed by other
types of violent crimes? That’s the question the proponents and
opponents of hate crimes laws ought to be debating. The short shrift
that question has received in the hate crimes debate is symptomatic
of the malignant influence of liberalism – or at least one conspicuous
version of it – on the formation and evolution of the criminal law.
My argument will unfold in three parts. In Part I, I take on
the fallacious argument that hate crime laws inappropriately punish
values rather than harms. In Part II, I address the mirror image
fallacy that hate crime laws appropriately punish harms rather than
values. Finally, in Part III, I link these two fallacies to a cluster of
liberal tropes that decisionmakers and commentators use to disguise
the law’s morally judgmental character – a feature of our legal prac-
tices that tends to reinforce the influence of traditional social norms
on law and to block progressive legal reform.
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I. THE “BAD-VALUE ADDED” FALLACY
According to their opponents, hate crimes laws violate liberal prin-
ciples by grounding punishment in the state’s condemnation of
offenders’ beliefs rather than in the harms these offenders impose.
Of course, all assaults impose harms that the state may legitimately
seek to avert. But because an individual who is beaten or killed on
account of his group affiliation is injured no more than an individual
who is beaten or killed on any other account, penalty enhancements
for hate crimes amount to an implicit “bad-valued added tax” on
violence. The opponents typically advance this thesis to show that
hate crime laws punish offenders for their “beliefs” in violation of
free speech principles.2
As Carol Steiker has demonstrated, this argument faces a sizeable
embarrassment – namely, the pervasive significance of motive in
criminal law.3 Homicide law evaluates the motive of enraged killers
when it determines whether they were “adequately provoked” by
their victims. The man who kills his wife because he resents her
infidelity will likely be convicted only of manslaughter,4 whereas
the one who kills because he resents his wife’s interference with
his professional opportunities will be convicted of murder.5 The
doctrine of duress evaluates motive when it determines whether the
defendant submitted to a threat that a “reasonable” person would
have resisted. The woman who assists in the assault of a stranger
in order to avoid being beaten herself will likely have a defense,
whereas the woman who acquiesces in the assault of her own child
2 See, e.g., James B. Jacobs and Kimberley Potter,Hate Crimes: Criminal
Law and Identity Politics(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 126–
127; Anthony M. Dillof, “Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical
Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes,”Northwestern Law Review91 (1997),
pp. 1017–1018; Susan Gellman, “Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can
Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic
Intimidation Laws,”UCLA Law Review39 (1991), pp. 362–363.
3 See Carol S. Steiker, “Punishing Hateful Motives: Old Wine in a New
Bottle Revives Calls for Prohibition,”Michigan Law Review97 (1999), pp. 1863–
1870.
4 See generally Wayne R. Lafave and Austin W. Scott, Jr.,Criminal Law (St.
Paul, Minn: West Publishing Co., 2nd edn., 1986), p. 656.
5 Cf. Commonwealth v. Carrol, 194 A.2d 911 (Pa. 1963).
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in order to avoid being beaten won’t.6 The law of self-defense makes
similar evaluations, treating the battered woman’s desire to escape
a life of degradation as an “unreasonable” ground for killing her
sleeping husband,7 but the “true man’s” commitment to his honor
as a “reasonable” one for killing an attacker he could easily have
evaded.8
The law even evaluates motive in determining whether an
offender deserves capital punishment. Thus, a man who kills
because he wants to mutilate or to have sex with his victim’s corpse
can be deemed to have committed a murder that is “outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman.”9 For that reason, he can
be sentenced to death for a homicide that would have resulted in a
sentence of only life imprisonment for someone with less disgusting
motives.10
These distinctions don’t turn on the injury that the offenders
impose on their victims – in each pair of cases the injuries
are, roughly speaking, the same. Rather they turn on the law’s
assessment of the offenders’ reasons for bringing those harmful
consequences about. When offenders’ motives show that they value
the right things in the right amount (their own physical well-being
over the well-being of strangers, their honor more than the lives of
wrongful aggressors), the law exonerates them. When their motives
show that they value the right things slightly too much relative
to other things they ought to care about (e.g., fidelity more than
the lives of unfaithful wives), the law mitigates their punishments.
When their motives show that they value the right things far too
much relative to other important things (their career advancement
more than their spouses’ lives, their own physical well-being more
than their children’s, their dignity over the lives of chronically
abusive husbands), the law affords them no dispensation. And when
6 ComparePeople v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992),
andMorrison v. State, 546 So. 2d 102, 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)with United
States v. Webb, 747 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 1984),andState v. Lucero, 647 P.2d
406 (N.M. 1982).
7 See, e.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
8 See generally Tennessee v. Renner, 912 S.W.2d 701 (Tenn. 1995).
9 See, e.g., Hance v. State, 268 S.E.2d 339, 346 (Ga. 1980).
10 See generally Dan M. Kahan, ‘‘The Anatomy of Disgustin Criminal Law,”
Michigan Law Review96 (1998), pp. 1644–1645.
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their motives show they value thewrong things altogether (e.g., the
defilement of corpses), the law punishes them all the more severely.
Inconveniently for the Millian critics of hate crime penalties, the
criminal law comprises a comprehensive series of bad-value added
taxes.11
What I want to add to Steiker’s critique is an account of
why the law pays this sort of attention to offenders’ motivating
values. The explanation isn’t that the law rejects (necessarily) the
Millian position that coercion is warranted only to prevent harmful
consequences rather than to sanction aberrant values. It’s that the
law uses offenders’ motivating values to individuate harms and to
measure their extent.
Start with a prosaic example. It’s said that even a dog knows
the difference between being tripped over and being kicked. The
harms associated with being inadvertently jostled and being deliber-
ately struck are obviously different, in nature and in magnitude, but
why? The answer isn’t that they invariably inflict different degrees
of injury; striking is morally worse than jostling even when the latter
happens to result in greater physical damage.
Obviously, we rank striking as worse than jostling because the
person who strikesintends to harm. But why exactly does that
matter? Assuming we aren’t dealing with an automaton, the person
who jostles another intends something too, if only to get from one
place to another.
The decisive point has to do with what the striker’s and jostler’s
respective intentions reveal about their ends. The person who
deliberately strikes another values another’s suffering, whereas the
person who accidentally jostles another values getting wherever it
is she’s going. The former valuation is morally worse – it makes a
bigger mistake about the objective worth of important things in the
world – than the latter.
In recognizing that, we won’t necessarily be committing
ourselves to the conclusion that the jostler’s valuations are perfectly
in order. People who adequately value the worth of other individuals
take precautions to avoid harming them, even inadvertently. If the
circumstances surrounding the jostler’s inattention suggest to us that
11 See generally Dan M. Kahan and Martha C. Nussbaum, “Two Conceptions
of Emotion in Criminal Law,”Columbia Law Review96 (1996), pp. 269–374.
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she doesn’t value others enough to take their interests into account
when she forms her own plans, we’ll subject her to moral condem-
nation. Indeed, we might subject her to legal condemnation too, in
the form of civil judgment for negligence if not a criminal conviction
for assault. In sum, the values that striking and jostling express are
what tell us that assault and negligence are distinct harms, and that
the former is worthy of greater punishment than the latter.12
We can deepen this point by connecting it to the expressive theory
of morality associated with the work of Jean Hampton, Elizabeth
Anderson, and Richard Pildes among others.13 According to this
account, social norms define how persons (and communities) who
value particular goods – whether the welfare of other persons, their
own honor or dignity, or the beauty of the natural environment
– should behave. Against the background of these norms, actions
express attitudes toward these goods.
When we morally evaluate a person’s actions, we consider not
only the desirability of the consequences they produce but also the
appropriateness of the attitudes they express. Imagine an “all terrain
vehicle” enthusiast who tried to justify the damage her hobby did to
sand dunes by contributing $10,000 a year to the Sierra Club. Even
if we were convinced that the contribution enabled that organization
to repair more damage than the person had caused, we’d still judge
the ATV enthusiast lacking in respect for the environment. Appro-
priately valuing the environment is inconsistent with taking pleasure
in a form of recreation notorious for degrading it.
12 See Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, “Expressive Harms, ‘Bizarre
Districts,’ and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances after
Shaw v. Reno,”Michigan Law Review92 (1993), p. 510.
13 See Jean Hampton, “The Retributive Idea,” in Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean
Hampton,Forgiveness and Mercy(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988) pp. 111–161 [hereinafter Hampton, Retributive Idea]; Jean Hampton, “An
Expressive Theory of Retribution,” in W. Cragg (ed.),Retributivism and Its Critics
(Stuttgart: Franz Stelner Verlag, 1992) [hereinafter, Hampton,Expressive Theory
of Retribution]; Elizabeth Anderson,Value in Ethics and Economics(1993);
Elizabeth S. Anderson and Richard H. Pildes, “Expressive Theories of Law:
A General Restatement,”University of Pennsylvania Law Review148 (2000),
pp. 1503–1575; Richard H. Pildes, “The Unintended Cultural Consequences of
Public Policy”,Michigan Law Review89 (1991), pp. 936–978; Dan M. Kahan,
“What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?,”University of Chicago Law Review63
(1996), pp. 591–653.
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By the same token, what moves us to condemn an actor for
harming another isn’t the simple perception that her actions have
diminished another person’s welfare, but rather the judgment that
her actions express too low a valuation of the other person’s
worth relative to the actor’s own ends. “[P]eople who believe their
purposes warrant them in taking another’s wallet, or another’s
savings, or another’s life,” Hampton writes, “are people who believe
their victims are not worth enough to require better treatment.”14
“Indeed, they are convinced enough about the importance of their
own purposes – and thus of their own importance – to regard their
behavior as permissible with respect to these others.”15 Punishing
the offender – in the appropriate way and to the appropriate degree –
is necessary to show that we, in contrast, do value the victim’s worth
appropriately relative to the wrongdoer’s interests and goals.16
This account helps to explain why the law sees only certain
types of harmful consequences as worthy of redress. A competitor’s
marketing of a superior product, for example, can harm a merchant
financially as much as the theft of her goods. The reason that theft
but not competition merits punishment is that theft expresses – in a
way that competition (ordinarily) does not – a false assessment of
the merchant’s worth. Against the background of social norms, the
thief’s behavior conveys to the merchant and to others that she views
the merchant’s interests as unworthy of her respect.17
The expressive theory also explains the law’s individuation and
grading of harms. The distinction between negligence and assault is
one example. Another is the distinction between assault and rape.
The reason we distinguish rape from assault and condemn it more
severely isn’t that rape invariably inflicts greater physical injury.
What makes rape distinctive, and distinctively worse, is the greater
contempt it evinces for its victim’s agency. In our culture, we recog-
nize the power to control one’s own sexuality as a central entailment
of the respect we owe individuals as autonomous, self-determining
beings. For that reason, few actions convey one’s subordination to
14 Hampton,Expressive Theory of Retribution, surpa, note 13, p. 8.
15 Id.
16 Seeid., pp. 12–13; Hampton,Retributive Idea, surpa, note 13, p. 130.
17 See Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Forgiveness and Resentment,” in Murphy and
Hampton,surpa, note 13, p. 25; Jean Hampton, “Forgiveness, Resenment and
Hatred,” in Murphy and Hampton,surpa, note 13, pp. 43–44.
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another as forcefully as being made an unwilling object of that
person’s sexual gratification. However bad it is to assault someone,
the offender who rapes makes an even bigger mistake about the
worth of his victim relative to his own ends and desires.18
The expressive view also makes it easier to understand the critical
reliance that the law makes upon doctrines that evaluate the quality
of offenders’ emotions. From premeditation to adequate provoca-
tion, from self-defense to duress, from insanity to the voluntary
act requirement, substantive criminal law views emotions not as
unthinking impulses, but rather as judgments of value. What does
and doesn’t enrage a person, terrify her, and even disgust her, all tell
us what she cares about. If the law thinks the valuations expressed in
an offender’s emotions are appropriate, then the offender’s passion
is treated as grounds for mitigation or exculpation. If it thinks those
valuations are inappropriate, then her passions become a basis for
withholding mitigation or even for increasing punishment.19
Hate crime laws assess the values expressed by an offenders’
actions in exactly the same way as the rest of criminal law. In
our society, individuals tend to construct their identities around
their ethnic and religious affiliations, their genders, and their sexual
orientations. An individual who assaults or kills another on account
of one of these characteristics, then, show us that he enjoys not
only the suffering of another human being, but also the experience
of domination and mastery associated with denigrating something
that the victim and others regard as essential to their selves. By
imposing greater punishment on those offenders, hate crime laws
say that society regards the harms they impose as different from
and worse than the harms inflicted by those who assault or kill
for other reasons. Like assaulters relative to negligent jostlers, and
rapists relative to assaulters, hate criminals relative to other types of
violent criminals are – in the law’s eyes – making an even bigger
18 Cf. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574–575 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that
“marital rape exception” violates Equal Protection Clause and rejecting argument
that ordinary assault prosecution is sufficient when husband forces sex on wife:
“The fact that rape statutes exist. . . is a recognition that the harm caused by a
forcible rape is different, and more severe, than the harm caused by an ordinary
assault. Short of homicide, [rape] is the ‘ultimate violation of self’ ” (quoting
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
19 See Kahan and Nussbaum,surpa, note 11.
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mistake about the objective worth of their victims. Of course, the
expressive parallel between hate crime laws and the rest of crim-
inal law doesn’t by itself prove that such laws are a good idea.
The moral judgments that the law makes when it uses offenders’
values to individuate and measure harms can themselves be morally
judged. Some have argued, for example, that the law is wrong to
view the true man’s valuation of honor or the cuckold’s valuation of
fidelity as any better than the valuations expressed by persons who
kill for other reasons.20 By the same token, opponents of hate crime
laws can argue that the law is wrong to view the values expressed
by hate crimes as any worse than those expressed by other types
of violence. What the opponents of hate crime laws can’t persua-
sively argue, however, is that hate crime laws are a bad idea because
they take values into account in a way that the rest of the law
does not.
II. THE “GREATER HARM” FALLACY
Most proponents of hate crime laws accept the Millian premise that
such laws must be justified on the basis of the harms as opposed to
the state’s aversion to hate criminals’ values. Penalty enhancements
are warranted, they maintain, because assaults motivated by group
animus do in fact impose greater individual and societal harms than
other types of assaults.21 Responding to the First Amendment chal-
lenge considered inWisconsinv. Mitchell,22 defenders of hate crime
laws argued that “bias-motivated crimes are more likely to provoke
retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims,
and incite community unrest.”23 The Supreme Court accepted this
contention as “an adequate explanation for [the state’s] penalty-
20 See Jeremy Horder,Provocation and Responsibility(New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), p. 39; Donna K. Coker, “Heat of Passion and Wife
Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill,”Southern Californa Review of Law and
Women’s Studies2 (1992), p. 79; Kahan and Nussbaum,surpa, note 11, p. 365.
21 See, e.g., Frederick M. Lawrence,Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes under
American Law(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 103.
22 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
23 Id., p. 488; see also Lawrence,surpa, note 21, pp. 40–42.
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enhancement provision over and above mere disagreement with
offenders’ beliefs or biases.”24
The critics of hate crime laws challenge the factual basis of this
“greater harm” argument. There’s no evidence, they contend, to
support the assertion that hate crime victims suffer greater emotional
distress (an argument, in any case, that wouldn’t apply to penalty
enhancements for homicides), or that third parties are more likely
to respond violently to hate crimes than other types of offenses.25
Moreover, because the sponsors of hate crime legislation typically
say that such laws would send a worthwhile “message” even if they
didn’t result in greater deterrence of bigoted crimes, critics also
question the sincerity of the greater harm argument.26
The real problem with the greater harm argument, however, is not
empirical but conceptual. Even assuming that hate crime penalty
enhancements are geared to deterring greater harms, those laws
can’t be justified independently of the state’s aversion to hate crim-
inals’ values. For as is true of the harms redressed by the criminal
law generally, the “greater harms” that hate crime laws are said to
deter are constructed by aversions to the values that such crimes
express.
Consider the greater harms that hate crimes are said to inflict
on victims. It’s perfectly plausible to think that a person who is
singled out for a violent assault because his attacker despises his
race, religion, or sexual orientation will experience greater psychic
trauma than someone attacked, say, because his attacker wants to
steal his money. In our society, many individuals view their group
affiliations as more central to their identities than their wealth; they
24 508 U.S. at 488. Defenders of hate crime laws also maintain that offenders
who engage in violence because of group animus are more culpable than
other violent offenders. The basis for this argument, however, is the conclu-
sion that individuals who knowingly or purposefully inflict greater harms are
more culpable than those who knowingly or purposefully inflict lesser ones. See,
e.g., Lawrence,surpa, note 21, pp. 60–61. Accordingly, the “greater culpability”
argument presupposes the “greater harm” argument.
25 See Jacobs and Potter,surpa, note 2, pp. 81–88; cf. Alon Harel and Gideon
Parchomovsky, “On Hate and Equality,”Yale Law Journal, 109 (1999), pp. 514–
515 (arguing that “greater harm to victims” is empirically unsupported in course
of defending hate crime laws on other grounds).
26 See, e.g.,id. at 65.
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are thus likely to experience attacks motivated by their affiliations as
greater transgressions of their dignity. But if that’s what’s going on,
the “distinct emotional harms” associated with hate crimes aren’t
genuinely independent of aversion to hate criminals’ values. On
the contrary, their aversion to their attackers’ animus toward their
group identities is precisely what causes victims to experience these
emotional harms.27
Aversion to hate criminals’ values plays just as clear a role in the
greater “societal harms” that hate crimes are alleged to inflict. If hate
crimes are indeed “more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes. . . and
incite community unrest,”28 that’s because third parties, too, judge
hate offenders’ motives to be more reprehensible – and thus more
worthy of a violent response – than those of other offenders. Some-
times hate crime law defenders say (plausibly, in my view) that bias
motivated assaults are perceived as an attack by all individuals who
share the group affiliations of the victim.29 But if that’s so, what’s
distressing those third parties istheir reaction to the low value that
hate crime offenders assign to members of their group.
Once she recognizes this relationship between harms and values,
an orthodox Millian liberal shouldn’t see any difference between
a statute that is predicated on deterring those harms and one that
is expressly predicated on repudiation of hate criminals’ values. It
wouldn’t be a defense to a discrimination claim for an employer
to say she refused to hire African Americans not because she was
prejudiced, but only because hercustomersdoubted the competence
of African–American employees. In that case, the law would treat
the responsiveness of the employer to her customers as simply the
mechanism by which racial prejudice was constraining African–
Americans’ job prospects.30 By the same token, it’s no defense to
the Millian objection for state legislators to explain that they are
enacting hate crime laws not becauseth yhappen to disagree with
hate offenders’ beliefs but only because theirconstituentsexperi-
ence distinctive harms from those crimes. Because those harms are
27 Cf. Lawrence,surpa, note 21, p. 62.
28 508 U.S. at 488.
29 See, e.g., Lawrence,surpa, note 21, pp. 42, 63.
30 Cf. Diaz v Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971)
(holding that passengers’ preference for female flight attendants did not immunize
airline from a sex discrimination claim by prospective male flight attendants).
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constructed by aversions to hate criminals’ values, a Millian liberal
should treat the responsiveness of legislators to their constituents as
simply the mechanism by which the law credits those aversions as a
ground for punishment.
Indeed, Millian liberals have had no problem seeing aversions
to values at the core of asserted societal harm arguments in other
settings. The traditional justification for punishing homosexuality is
the offensiveness of same-sex desire pure and simple. In his famous
critique of the Wolfenden Report, Lord Devlin tried to strengthen
the traditional justification, arguing that the ban on homosexuality
reflected the danger that social order would dissolve were the law
to disregard its citizens’ most intensely held moral convictions.31
H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, and other Millian liberals wasted no
time in pointing out that Devlin’s argument added nothing, or at least
nothing of consequence, to the traditional argument from offense.32
Even assuming that Devlin’s alarming conjectures were empirically
sound, the disorder he anticipated would itself have originated in
the disappointment of citizens’ demand that offensive behavior be
prohibited; in punishing homosexuality to avoid the “harm” of social
disorder, then, the law would still have been treating aversion to
same-sex desire as a legitimate ground for coercion. The relation-
ship between social disorder and aversions in Devlin’s argument is
indistinguishable from the relationship between social disorder and
aversions in the “greater harm” argument that the Supreme Court
accepted inWisconsinv. Mitchell.
This parallel certainly doesn’t mean that supporters of hate crime
laws must climb into bed with Devlin when it comes to the criminal-
ization of homosexuality. But it does mean that if one wants to
defend hate crime laws at the same time that one criticizes homo-
sexual sodomy laws, one must explain why the law isright to credit
aversions to hate criminals’ values andwrong to credit aversions to
same-sex desire.
31 See Patrick Devlin,The Enforcement of Morals(New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1965).
32 See H.L.A. Hart,Law, Liberty, and Morality(New York: Vintage Books,
1963); H.L.A. Hart, “Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality,”Univer-
sity of Chicago Law Review35 (1967), pp. 1–13; Ronald Dworkin, “Lord Devlin
and the Enforcement of Morals,”Yale Law Journal,] 75 (1966), p. 986.
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III. THE CONSERVATIVE BIAS OF LIBERAL ANTIMORALISM
The decisive question in the hate crime debate can’t be whether
hate crime laws punish values or harms. Without taking account
of the values that offenders’ actions express, the law wouldn’t
be able to individuate harms or measure their severity. The only
way to determine whether hate crime laws are appropriate or not,
then, is to assess the moral appraisalthey express head on: is it
true that persons who engage in violence because of group animus
devalue their victims in a manner that is distinct from and more
reprehensible than those who engage in violence for myriad other
reasons?
The remainder of this essay, however, isn’t designed to answer
this question but rather to motivate the insistence that the protag-
onists in the hate crimes debate expressly attend to it. Far more
than analytical clarity is at stake. By framing their disagreement
in a manner that elides the need to take a stance on the values of
hate crime offenders, both sides reinforce the dominance of a de-
moralized form of legal discourse that ultimately makes the law
more congenial to traditional social norms and more resistant to
progressive reform.
The language of substantive law doctrines tends to obscure the
morally judgmental stance of the law toward offenders’ values. To
the untrained eye, homicide doctrines like “premeditation,”33 “heat
of passion,”34 and “extreme mental or emotional disturbance”35
seem to make the severity of punishment turn on the force rather
than on moral quality of defendant’s motivating passions. So too
do defenses like duress, which is said to excuse when “the will
of the accused has been overborne by threats,”36 insanity, which
excuses offenders who are subject to “irresistible impulses,”37 and
33 See Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott,surpa, note 4, §7.7.
34 Id., §7.10.
35 Model Penal Code §210.3(1)(b).
36 E.g., Regina v. Hudson, [1971] 2 All E.R. 244, 246.
37 See Abraham Goldstein, The Insanity Defense (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1967).
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self-defense, which courts sometimes describe as a concession to
humans’ “primal impulse” of “self-preservation.”38
This impression is reinforced by the two dominant scholarly
theories of criminal law.Voluntarism, which derives from Kantian
moral philosophy, treats punishment as justified if, and to the
extent that, the offender’s behavior stems from choice.Consequen-
tialism, which derives from utilitarian theory, views punishment as
warranted if, and to the extent that, visiting suffering on the offender
is necessary to promote favored states of affairs. The former theory
cares about an offender’s motivating passions only to the extent that
they interfere with volition, and the latter only to the extent that they
impel the offender to act in ways that the law wants to encourage
or discourage. Neither theory purports to assign any independent
normative significance to the valuations that offenders’ motivations
express.39
But precisely because they ignore the expressive logic of
the criminal law, the naïve reading as well as the conventional
theories are in fact inadequate. Homicide gradations and crim-
inal law defenses are subject to various qualitative delimiters –
“adequate provocation,” “reasonable person” requirements, and
even “disease,” a concept the law defines in distinctively moral
rather than medical terms. These delimiters, it can be shown, with-
hold mitigation to offenders whose passions and impulses express
what judges and juries see as inappropriate values, no matter how
destructive those passions are of offenders’ capacities to choose.40
It’s true in some sense that these doctrines tailor punishment to
the tendency of offenders to promote or frustrate favored states of
affairs. But upon investigation, it turns out that the the state of affairs
that the law favors are derivative of the moral appraisals decision-
38 E.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 12–13 (N.C. 1989); see also Thomas
Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Penguin Classics, 1985) (1651), pp. 345–346 (“If
a man by the terrour of present death, be compelled to doe a fact against the
Law, he is totally Excused; because no Law can oblige a man to abandon his own
preservation.. . Nature. . . compels him to the fact.”).
39 See Kahan and Nussbaum,surpa, note 11, pp. 301–304. Hurd’s contribution
to this issue neatly encapsulates these conventional – but deeply flawed – accounts
of how emotions and like dispositions figure in criminal law doctrine. See Heidi
Hurd,Why Liberals Should Hate Hate Crime Legislation, L. and Phil.
40 See Kahan and Nussbaum,surpa, note 11, pp. 301–346.
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makers make of the values expressed in offenders’ motivating
passions.41
It’s possible, in short, to dispel the doctrinal obscurity and
misdirected theorizing that conceal the law’s moralistic core. But it
takes a large amount of philosophical labor to do so. Why does our
legal order make so sizeable an investment in constructing a morally
sanitized idiom to describe and justify its basic operations?
The answer is the influnce of a particular brand of liberalism
in our legal and political culture. Accepting the fact of permanent
moral dissensus, liberalism so understood enjoins us to justify our
positions on public issues in terms acceptable to those of diverse
cultural and moral persuasions.42 This directive is reinforced by
social norms that expose ordinary citizens to censure for public
moralizing, and by strategic incentives that discourage (most) public
officials from resorting to culturally and morally divisive rhetoric.
As a result of these dynamics, participants in the legal culture
converge on forms of discourse that abstract from and elide the
morally partisan judgments that animate their positions on conten-
tious issues. The mechanistic idiom that pervades substantive crim-
inal law doctrine and the de-moralized abstractions that inform
voluntarism and consequentialism satisfy this function.43
So do the terms in which the hate crimes debate is conventionally
framed. Mill’s “harm” principle is, of course, a mainstay of liberal
moral theory. It tests whether coercion does in fact have a justifi-
cation independent of the ambition to impose a partisan conception
of the good on those who disagree with it. By invoking Mill’s harm
principle, the critics of hate crime laws can explain their opposition
without directly contesting the moral and ideological commitments
of these laws’ supporters. By purporting to conform these provi-
sions to the harm principle, defenders of hate crime laws needn’t
acknowledge their ambition to use the expressive capital of the law
to underwrite their struggle against hierarchical social norms.
41 Seeid. at 312, 335–336.
42 See generally John Rawls,Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1993); Bruce A. Ackerman,Social Justice and the Liberal
State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson,Democracy and Disagreement(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1996).
43 See generally Dan M. Kahan, “The Secret Ambition of Deterrence,”Harvard
Law Review113 (1999), pp. 413–500.
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Whatever might be said in favor of the power of liberal discourse
strategies to mute political conflict in law in general,44 its power
to obscure the morally judgmental character of criminal law in
particular should be regarded as pernicious. For in that context, the
irrepressible tendency of such strategies is to stack the rhetorical
deck of the law in favor of traditionally hierarchical social norms
and against progressive egalitarian ones.
The mechanistic veneer of criminal law doctrines, voluntarist and
consequentialist rationalizations of them, and arguments founded
in the Millian harm principle all falsely purport to justify coer-
cion without resort to contestable moral valuations. To determine
whether a person “reasonably” submitted to her anger or fear, we
must first contentiously assess whether it was reasonable, morally,
for her to value the good that was endangered by the provoking or
threatening circumstance. To determine whether punishing an indi-
vidual will promote desired states of affairs, we must first make
contentious judgments about what state of affairs is desirable. To
identify and evaluate the harms associated with acts of violence, we
must first identify the values that motivate individuals to engage in
them.
The only situation in which liberal tropes will succeed in
concealing decisionmakers’ contestable moral judgments is when
those judgments are rooted in social norms that have tradition-
ally enjoyed widespread consensus. Our perceptions of “choice,”
“dangerousness,” “harm” and the like are all socially constructed.
But so long as the law doesn’t diverge too sharply from traditional
social norms, the work that those norms do in constructing the
apprehension of these phenomena will be essentially invisible. In
a society that has traditionally valued patriarchal conceptions of
honor, it will seem perfectly natural for “a man of good moral
character[,]. . . highly respected in his community, [and] having
regard for his duties as a husband and the virtue of women,” to
be “shocked” to the point of “temporary insanity” upon “learning
44 For defenses, see David A. Strauss, “Legal Arguments and the Overlapping
Consensus” (unpublished manuscript, July 12, 1998); Cass R. Sunstein,Legal
Reasoning and Political Conflict(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996),
pp. 35–47.
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of the immorality [i.e., infidelity] of his wife.”45 In one that has
traditionally been repulsed by homosexuality, it will seem perfectly
obvious and uncontroversial to describe the killing of a gay person
by a man he solicited at a bar as a “one-time tragedy” committed
by an otherwise peaceful individual who the decisionmaker can be
“confident. . . w[ill] not kill again.” 46
The situation is strikingly different, however, when legal
reformers advocate doctrinal reforms founded on emerging but still
highly contested norms. At that point, the evaluative work that those
norms and associated moral evaluations are doing becomes trans-
parent.47 And against the background of the de-moralized liberal
tropes that decisionmakers and commentators use to justify the law,
the law’s receptivity to these nontraditional moral claims will always
seem transparently illegitimate.
Victoria Nourse makes this point to explain the influence of
the so-called “abuse excuse” critique.48 Commentators advance
this critique against the law’s growing receptivity to forcible self-
help by the victims of chronic domestic violence.49 The scientific
evidence underlying “battered woman syndrome” and like condi-
tions, these commentators argue, is far too weak to support the
conclusion that individuals who resort to violence in such circum-
stances are suffering from genuine volitional impairment; courts
accept such evidence nonetheless, the critics claim, only because
they sympathize with the ideological convictions that inspire these
doctrinal reforms. But as Nourse notes, the law hasalwaysindulged
facile claims of volitional impairment to excuse the virtuous outlaw.
45 Hamilton v. State, 244 P.2d 328, 335 (Okla. Crim. App. 1952).
46 See Steven Hunt, “Victim’s Family, Gays Say Killer Got Off Too Easy,”Salt
Lake Tribune, Aug. 16, 1997, p. C7; “Judge Draws Protest After Cutting Sentence
of Gay Man’s Killer,” N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1994, p. A15.
47 See Steiker,surpa, note 3, p. 1870.
48 See Victoria Nourse, “The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the
Resurgence of Judgment in the Criminal Law,”Stanford Law Review50 (1998),
pp. 1435–1470.
49 See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz,The Abuse Excuse: and Other Cop-outs, Sob
stories, and Evasions of Responsibility(Boston: Little, Brown, 1994). See also
Kahan and Nussbaum,surpanote 11, at 349; James Q. Wilson,Moral Judgment:
Does the Abuse Excuse Threaten Our Legal System?(New York: BasicBooks,
1997).
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The only thing that makes the “abuse excuse” epithet resonate is
that the identity of the virtuous outlaw has changed as traditional
hierarchical norms have come under attack from new, egalitarian
ones: he used to be the vengeful cuckold; she’s now the battered
woman.50
The same myopia, induced by the same bias against emerging
norms, is the only thing that makes the Millian critique of hate
crime laws appear plausible. The critics object to the use of such
laws to condemn offenders’ aberrant values rather than the harms
they inflict. But conceptually and practically speaking, the role that
values play in defining the harm addressed by hate crime plays is
no different from the role that they play in defining the diverse
harms addressed by homicide gradations, rape law, capital sentenc-
ing provisions, and a host of other doctrines. Condemnation of
values is more visible in hate crime laws than in these other areas
only because the norms that inform hate crimes, unlike the norms
that inform these other provisions, are nontraditional and contested.
So long as the official language of criminal law remains the de-
moralized idiom of liberalism, progressive reformers will continue
to be at a disadvantage in doctrinal debates. The weakness of the
“greater harm” argument attests to the futility of trying to adapt the
conventional liberal tropes to progressive ends. In the hate crime
debate and elsewhere, progressives should ruthlessly expose the
partisan moral judgments that underlie the doctrines they want to
abolish, and defend without embarrassment the ones that underlie
the doctrines they propose instead.51
CONCLUSION
The proponents and opponents of hate crime laws share an assump-
tion: that the legitimacy of such laws depends on whether they
deter harms independent of the state’s aversion to hate criminals’
noxious ideologies. This shared assumption reflects the influence
of orthodox liberal theory, which holds that coercion is warranted
50 See also Kahan and Nussbaum,surpa, note 11, pp. 349–350.
51 See generally Dan M. Kahan, “The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust,”
in Susan A. Bandes (ed.),The Passions of Law(New York: NYU Press, 2000).
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only to prevent harm to others and not to condemn individuals for
subscribing to aberrant values.
I have tried to show that the debate, so framed, is miscast.
Conceptually and practically speaking, it is impossible to draw
a distinction between the harms that violent criminals inflict and
the values that motivate them to act. Hate crime laws do punish
offenders for their aberrant values in this sense. But so do the rest of
the provisions that make up criminal law. It’s impossible to imagine
things being otherwise.
The real question that those for and against hate crime laws
should be debating is whether those laws are right to see hate crim-
inals’ values as more worthy of condemnation than those of other
violent offenders. No light will be shed on this issue – or on a variety
of other urgent topics – until both sides step out from behind the
shadow of John Stuart Mill.
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